FEDERALISM AND CONFEDERALISM BY POLYTECHNIC STUDENT

FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC NEKEDE OWERRI P.M .B 1036, OWERRI IMO STATE SEMINAR ON DISCUSS THE DIFFDERENCE BETWEEN FEDERALISM AND CONFEDERALISM WITH EXPRESS EAMPLES WRITTEN BY GROUP H NAMES: REG. NO: NDUKAEZE FORTUNE ABII CHINAGOROM STANLEY 14E/0012/URP OTUECHERE UCHECHUKWU CHARLES 14E/0028/URP UWALAKA CONFORT LEDOGO CONFIDENCE 14E/0017/URP DEPT: URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING LEVEL: NDI EVENING COURSE TITLE: CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION II COURSE CODE: GNS 128 LECTURER: HIS EXCELLENCY DATE: AUGUST, 2015. ABSTRACT In order to gain new insights into the fundamental changes in the federal system made under the Constitution and the current debate over federalism, this article compares the federal structures established under the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation. It first discusses certain early models of political union that may have influenced the thoughght of the framers of the Articles and the Constitution. Many of the concepts underlying the federal structures of the Articles and the Constitution may be found in the works of various political writers with whom the framers were familiar. In particular, the concept of a division of sovereignty between a general government and subordinate governments was not novel. The article also examines the text of the Articles and Constitution, analyzing structural similarities and differences that are relevant in establishing their respective federal systems. Many of the provisions establishing the federal structure under the Constitution had analogues in the Articles. The article also applies social compact theories that were prevalent in the late eighteenth century in an attempt to gain greater understanding of the nature of the federal system established under the Articles and the Constitution. The analysis demonstrates a fundamental difference between the Articles and the Constitution: the latter represented a compact among both the people and the states, whereas the former represented a compact among the states alone. In other words, the Constitution represented merely a partial consoldiation of the states--it was not a compact among the people alone. Finally, the article applies this theory to several constitutional questions such as the constitutionality of secession and the proper interpretation of the enumerated powers of the general government INTRODUCTION One of the classic challenges of political organization is the territorial or spatial division of power. Just as constitutional engineers, politicians, and philosophers have struggled over the concentration or separation of horizontal (e.g., executive, legislative, and judicial) powers, so too have battles been fought over the distribution of vertical (e.g., central, regional, and local) authority. Although the late 20th and early 21st centuries have featured significant movement in favor of boundary broadening and the interdependence of outward-looking states, the salience of interactions among countries’ internal units remains high. Indeed, understanding the contemporary nation-state demands that political scientists make sense of the centrifugal pressures of decentralization that coexist alongside centralizing trends of integration and unification. Scholars have generally classified approaches to the geographic dispersion of governmental authority by grouping states into unitary, federal, and confederal types. Research on the different system types has evolved from early work on nation building and pacification of regional tensions to contemporary efforts to explain differences in the quality of representation, in the durability of alternative models, and in the adaptability of structural designs to the changing demands of global interdependence. Unitary systems are those in which sovereignty, decision- making authority, and revenue-raising powers are clearly and solely vested in a single central government. Subnational units may exist in unitary states, but they enjoy only those powers specifically delegated or “devolved” to them by the central government, and those powers can be revoked at the center’s discretion. The majority of the world’s states today exemplify characteristics matching this definition of the unitary system. Among those are France (the “one and indivisible” state long held up as a quintessential example of the unitary model), Japan, and China. Theory An impressive body of political science literature has evolved regarding the different forms that geographic distribution of power can take. The contemporary literature rests on a foundation of centuries’ worth of writings by political philosophers and constitutional architects who focused squarely on both the normative and practical questions of how to build a desired polity. Among those who emerged along this lengthy early chronology to deliberate the proper balance of centralization and decentralization were Althusius, Grotius, Montesquieu, Mill, Hobbes, and Madison. Althusius’s Politica, written in 1603, is, for example, considered by many to have been the earliest coherent formulation of bicameralism as a method of consensual decision making by communities within a union. Hobbes has often been held up as a defender of the model of centralism (manifested most clearly by the United Kingdom’s Westminster system), and Madison is one of the most frequently cited defenders of decentralization as a mechanism for the prevention of tyranny (exemplified by the American federal experience). Their ideas provided inspiration for founders and reformers in multiple country contexts. CONFEDERATION A confederation is an association of sovereign member states, that by treaty have delegated certain of their competences to common institutions, in order to coordinate their policies in a number of areas, without constituting a new state on top of the member states. Under international law a confederation respects the sovereignty of its members and its constituting treaty can only be changed by unanimous agreement. Wikipedia emphasizes three important differences between a confederation and a federation: By definition the difference between a confederation and a federation is that the membership of the member states in a confederation is voluntary, while the membership in a federation is not. A confederation is most likely to feature these differences over a federation: (1) No real direct powers: many confederal decisions are externalised by member-state legislation. (2) Decisions on day-to-day-matters are not taken by simple majority but by special majorities or even by consensus or unanimity (veto for every member). (3) Changes of the constitution, usually a treaty, require unanimity. AN EXAMPLE OF CONFEDERATION TO FEDERATION IN EUROPE The confederation established by the 1815 Federal Treaty was an explicit attempt to go back in time to the old ways of the Swiss tradition and to forget as much as possible of the revolutionary period. However, the forces unleashed by the revolution could not be kept at bay, and they put increased pressure on the institutional structure of the last confederation as it entered the 1830s and 1840s. Most of these forces were part of the broader ‘liberal movement’ sweeping Europe from which Switzerland could not isolate itself. Moreover, the Europe-wide battle between liberal and radical forces on one side and conservative and reactionary ones on the other also led to Switzerland’s becoming an object of external pressure, particularly from Austria and France. These liberal cantons set up a constitutional commission entrusted with a ‘revision’ of the Treaty, but, as it turned out, they ended up drafting a constitution for a federal state thereby radically changing the nature of the Swiss political system. Subsequently, the new constitution was ratified by popular referendum in all but one of the cantons, with 13 and a half votes in favour and 6 and a half against. In September the last Diet gathered to promulgate the new constitution and establish the new federal state, although, strictly speaking, the procedures by which the new constitution was being adopted were illegal under the terms of the existing Federal Treaty. The cantons defeated in the civil war voted against the new constitution both at the Diet and in the ratification process but ultimately accepted the outcome and The Dynamics of Confederalism and Federalism participated in the subsequent election for the new federal parliament. The new parliament gathered for the first time in November 1848 in Berne, which was made the permanent capital. APPLICATIONS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE Much empirical work has been assembled in attempts to explain why unitary, confederal, and federal forms emerge, endure, and sometimes collapse. As argued by Tarr (Kincaid & Tarr, 2005), those questions and answers find specific form in a range of empirical markers that political scientists can and should compare: adherence by governments and politicians to the regime’s constitutional provisions, the political and social (in)stability produced by the choice of territorial governance model, popular support and satisfaction, democratic performance, provision and guarantees for individual and/or communal rights, and economic performance. Contemporary cases demonstrate that the durability of unitary forms—still the most frequent arrangement for territorial governance—requires adaptation. Indeed, many countries long considered exemplars of centralized governmental structure have in recent decades engaged in decentralization reforms while stopping well short of committing to a federal bargain. Adaptation through decentralization has been a function of multiple influences. Economic contraction beginning in the 1970s, for one, spawned a number of reforms by central governments aimed at “offloading” burdens to regional and provincial units. Elsewhere decentralization became an instrumental part of oppositional politics—out parties struggling to win office found that pledges to dismantle unitary states could produce gains at the ballot box, and once in office, some of those newly incumbent parties delivered on campaign promises. POLICY IMPLICATIONS If history is littered with examples of territorial governance structures that failed, then it offers a cautionary tale to those reforming old systems or seeking to create new ones in the aftermath of civil conflict or interstate wars. For this reason, political science research on unitary, federal, and confederal arrangements is particularly salient to policymakers seeking solutions to ethnic or territorial discord in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Serbia. There they must ask and answer questions about the institutional forms and procedural safeguards that will give the system the greatest chance to achieve policy objectives (e.g., stability, legitimacy, protection of minorities, production of public goods, and economic efficiencies). Bermeo (2002) argues that “no violent separatist movement has ever succeeded in a federal democracy” (p. 108). If that is the case, then policymakers in divided societies will have to balance the presumed peaceful by-products of federalism against the traps into which previous but now-defunct federations have fallen. One of the most contentious policy areas is language. In unitary states, the central government will typically have exclusive jurisdiction over official language rights. That kind of exclusive control frequently coincides with conscious policies of assimilation. By contrast, federal states will normally grant shared or overlapping powers to central as well as regional governments. If federalist principles are pursued, then the ideal policy outcome would be some effective balance between unity and diversity such that citizens using majority and minority languages are equally protected. In Canada, for example, francophone minorities outside Quebec and anglophone minorities inside Quebec enjoy equivalent constitutional protections. The Belgian federation grants exclusive powers to community institutions to regulate language (as well as culture and education). In Spain, which embodies certain elements of federalism without formally constituting a federation, language laws protect Catalonia’s unique language and even make prohibitions against excessive use of the nationally dominant Castilian. India’s federal system provides official status for many of its minority languages, such as Punjabi and Marathi. In transitioning and contested states such as Iraq, policy uncertainty over minority languages could potentially thwart consolidation of a new polity. Recognized alongside Arabic under a 2005 Iraqi constitution, the Kurdish language presently enjoys formal protection and guarantees that elude Kurds in neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria. There are also related policy implications in the area of education. In unitary France, for example, education is so highly centralized that it has long been said that one could look at the clock at any given time and know exactly what textbook schoolchildren throughout the country were reading at that moment. In Canada, by contrast, the federal government has no central education ministry; instead, each province has its own political and administrative infrastructure with discretionary powers over education. Likewise, in the U.S. federal system, education is the responsibility of local (usually county) and state authorities. Pressures to democratize more tenuous federations have led, in places such as Brazil, to policies of educational decentralization. Elsewhere, as in federal Argentina, education has been decentralized to the local level largely on the basis of cost efficiencies and reductions in central government fiscal deficits. FUTURE DIRECTIONS Political science research on federal, and confederal forms of territorial governance has been preoccupied, first, by the struggle to draw clear distinctions between the three concepts; second, by the desire to explain why different institutional designs have been adopted and adapted; and third, by efforts to isolate the impact of federalism on such key outcomes as ethnic group accommodation and system stability. Real advances in our understanding of state forms have emerged, but definitive findings are few and far between. This leaves much room for future research. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FEDERALISM AND CONFEDERALISM. The basic difference is that confederalism is a system where the central government is always quite weak whereas in federalism the central government can be quite a bit stronger. In a confederal system, the "lower" levels of government (states, for example) have all the power. They give whatever power they like to the national government. A modern example is the UN where the UN only has what powers the member countries give it. In federalism, there is a founding document (like the US Constitution) that spells out what powers are given to the central government and what powers are kept by the states. The state governments do not determine what powers the national government has. Instead, the constitution determines this. Federalism is a concept applicable to a county or a nation, while confederalism refers to the practice of cooperation and collaboration between countries. Federal system refers to a system of government in a country in which the power of government is divided between a central government and several regional government. The United States of America, and India, for example, are countries run by federal system of government. The opposite of federal system may be called a unitary system of government in which all power is vested in a central government. Regional government machinery derives all its powers by delegation from the central government. In a true federal system powers in some matters are reserved for the regional or state governments, while power in other matters the central government has power over the people of all the country. The respective powers of the state and the central governments are decided by the constitution of the country, and neither the central nor state governments have the authority to unilaterally change such division of powers. As opposed to this feature of federalism, a confederation can only act through its individual member states. The confederation has no authority to directly control of action of people in different member countries. It can do so only through government of individual member states or countries. CONCLUSION The study of territorial dispersion of power in a system of governance is as old as modern political science, and it clearly dates further back to classical debates about the ideal polity. Contemporary efforts to understand the causes and consequences of different state designs have had to struggle first with establishing distinguishable concepts that accurately capture global variation. Scholars have traditionally had a relatively easy time defining unitary systems and classifying states within that category; however, devolutionary trends and reforms within unitary states have created the odd hybrid of decentralized but still unitary polities that defy simple classification. Although numerous attempts have been made to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a country to be labeled a federation, it is simultaneously apparent that no two federations are alike. Indeed, the institutional forms that federations take are a function of alternative conceptions of federalism. SUMMARY In summary a confederal system, power is extremely diffuse -- there is little central political control. Regional governments (such as states) can set fiscal and trade policy (e.g., set tariffs and taxes) and the like. The states might adopt a common currency in a confederation to ease interstate trade. For example, Rhode Island by itself might not be able to get a beneficial trade agreement with France, but working in concert with the other states, it can get a better deal, since the confederation as a whole is a larger player. Confederal governments can affect some aspects of internal policy as it relates to trade between the states, and other areas of interstate interaction, but the bulk of power is devolved -- that is, the legislature of any one state can set its own laws independently of any other state. Confederal systems are rare. The second option, more centralized than the first, is the federal system. In a federal system, the central (or federal) government has much more authority than in a confederal system. The central government controls more trade policy, and makes decisions about policy areas that involve interactions between states (such as highway systems). It usually has the power to tax independently of the states and to control the money supply. A federal government also usually has its own mechanisms for enforcement. For example, in the USA, the FBI is the primary agency for investigating federal crimes and crimes that occur between or among multiple states. In a federal system, federal laws usually trump state laws when the two are in conflict. Federal systems (or federations) are more common than confederal governments today. RECOMMENDATION We therefore recommend that federalism is of good benefit to the world as follow (1) Protection against external pressures: federal defense is a defense against divide and conquer. (2). Concentrating military and diplomatic resources into a common pool. (3). Economic benefits from a larger market (economic rationales are insufficient – the same could be achieved by a customs union). For federalism to be attainable there must be "mutual compatibility of main values." (4). Means of preserving national unity: EG: Reorganization of states along linguistic lines may save India; 1968 Federal state of Czechoslovakia did not survive. While Confederation is top-down, but if a state fails to carry out confederate instruc¬tions, the confedera¬tion may take action only against state aut-horities. 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