Independence of the Judiciary

Independence of the Judiciary Abstract The increasing reliance by Nigeria polity on the court to decide major issues and public interest has also brought it into sharp focus. Informed opinions on t he Judiciary in Nigeria varies between those who believe that the “Judiciary is dead” or that it is “on trial” and the more compassionate view that it is a “beast of burden” or a “sacrificial lamb”. These r emarks derive from observations of the alleged or a ctual behaviours of the judges and their independence, im partiality and integrity. While the above metaphor s may be subject to various interpretations, they do raise consideration, curiosity and interest as to w hy any Judiciary should attract such comments and perhaps to what extent the concepts are justified. This pa per examines whether the independence of the Judiciary in Nigeria is a myth or reality and concludes that the high sounding constitutional provision relating to judicial independence has no bite and what could ha ve been constitutional guarantees of judicial independ ence is no more than a slogan in Nigeria thence cal ling for reforms. Key words : Independence, Judiciary, Judicial Independence an d Judicial Powers Introduction The central trust and objective of this paper is tolook at the independence of the Judiciary in Nigeria whether it is a myth or reality and to conclude with recommendations. Of the three arms of government, the Judiciary is the branch of government that enables our decisions to be translated into law, the justice of which must be a pparent. 1 The Judiciary has the duty of directing society to the attainment of justice. Ins titutionally therefore, the Judicial process is in a sense the heart of any political system even in the must organized societies, the role of the leader in settling disputes was perhaps, the most i mportant and most frequently performed. 2 That the nations Judiciary is currently passing thr ough a difficult and traumatic phase in its annals is quite obvious and certainly not in doubt. It is a phase which is evidently marked by deep loss of faith in the judicial process and the courts. Claims of ethnic lopsidedness in the composition of the Federal Judiciary, serious alleg ation of corruption, ineptitude, laziness, incompetence against judicial officers, charges of abuse of office even against the Supreme Court judges in the discharge of its judicial funct ions and stemming out from want of judicial independence are bound. 3 The above has prevented the Nigerian Judiciary ove r the years from acting as a check on the excesses of other arm of g overnment within its constitutional boundaries. This paper posits that the lack of independence of the Judiciary in Nigeria has paved the way to the myriads of problems bedeviling the Judic iary ranging from lack of courage and temptation to corruption in deciding political case s especially the determination of election petition, appointment of judges, security of tenure and remuneration, institutional autonomy, judicial accountability, adequacy of resources for the courts, media and societal pressure and scope of judicial power and justifiability greatly affects the Judiciary. It is now apt to look at some conceptual clarifications MEANING OF INDEPENDENCE, JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL IND EPENDENCE “ Independence ” has been defined by Black’s Law Dictionary 4 as t he state or quality of being independent especially a country’s freedom to manag e all its affairs, whether external or internal, wi thout control by other countries. The word “ Judiciary ” has been defined 5 as the system of court of justice in a country. The department of Government charged or co ncerned with the administration of justice, the judges, taken collectively, as, the liberties of th e people are secured by a wise and independent Judi ciary. The term in its current use, is used in describing the method of selecting judges in a state or countr y; as an adjective, of appertaining to the administration of justice or the court”. Judiciary has equally been defined 6 as: “The judges of a state collectively”. Therefor e, Judiciary is a collection of all judges be it first instance of trial judges or appellate j udges. From these definitions, the Judiciary can be summarized up to mean that branch of government in a democratic system of government of the people, by the people and for the people” 7 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE There appears not to be a précised definition of wh at judicial independence means. However, in simple terminology, judicial independence can be de fined as the ability of a judge to decide a matter free from pressures or inducements. The Jud iciary as an institution, judicial independence means the ability of the Judiciary to be independent by being separate from government and other concentrations of power. 8 The principal role of an independent Judiciary is to uphold the rule of law and to ensure the supr emacy of the law. RESPONSIBILITY ALLOCATED TO THE JUDICIARY BY THE CO NSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1999 OF ITS ROLE TO THE SOCIETY The vesting of judicial powers 9 in the courts established by the 1999 Constitution imposes onerous responsibilities on judicial officers whose primary function is to administer justice according to law and the constitution. The nature of the office and functions of judicial officer’s call for a high sense of duty, responsibi lity, commitment, discipline, great intellect, integrity, probity and transparency. 10 So important is the place of Judiciary in the sche me of things that the constitution forbids the legislatur e from enacting any law that: “Oust or purports to oust the jurisdiction of a cou rt of law or of a judicial tribunal established by law” 11 The Judiciary been the third arm of government has the onerous function of interpreting the laws. Its functions may be expressed in the latin words jus-dicere non jus dare which is to declare the law and not make one. It is for the ju dge to declare the existing law and not make one (Judicis est jus dicere non dare) . This principle was confirmed by the Supreme Cour t per Bairamin F. J. in OKUMAGBA VS EGBE 12 thus: “Feeling that the appellant deserve to be punished, the chief magistrate replaced the word “another candidate” by the words “any candidate” and thus enable himself to punish t he appellant. In effect, he amended the regulation, but amendment is the function of the legislature and the courts cannot fill the gap which comes to light by altering the words of a regulation to make it re ad in the way he think it should have been enacted. As Lord Bacon s aid in his essay on judicature, the office of a judge is jus dicere non jus dare to state the law not to give law, and the court below should not have gone in for judicial legislation International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research (IJPAMR), Vol. 2, No 3, August, 2014 Website: http://www.rcmss.com. ISSN: 2350-2231 (Online) ISSN: 2346-7215 (Print) Ibrahim A bdullahi 2014, 2(3):55-66 58 Research Centre for Management and Social Studies “It should be noted that though election petition a re said to be sui- genesis, they are concerned with the political righ ts and obligations of the people particularly those who consider their rights injured by the electoral process and need to ventilate their g rievances. Such people ought to be encouraged to do so with some la titude knowing that in the process of initiating proceedings to ve ntilate their grievances, mistakes, such as those in the instant case may occur since the intention of the Electoral Act and the la ws employed in litigation are geared towards ensuring that substan tial justice is done to the parties at the expense of technicalitie s, any conclusion that tends to shut out an aggrieved part from the t emple of justice by not hearing him on the merit ought not to be encour aged in the interest of peace and democracy” 29 LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWERS The exercise of judicial powers is not absolute. I t has certain limitations summarized as follows: 1. The general principle under the common law as app lied in our court is that the court in the course of adjudication ought not to answer hypo thetic questions. 2. Nigerian judges cannot commonly apply their power s until someone brings a case before them. 30 They lack the power of self starter. 31 Thence, the court cannot initiate the power of reviewing legislative and executive ac ts. They must be moved and or initiated by someone. ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE The concept of judicial independence has many eleme nts which can broadly fall under the headings of: (i) Appointment and Removal of judicial officers and judicial staff (ii) Security of tenure and remuneration of judges a nd supporting staff (iii) Budgetary provisions (process) (iv) Individual and institutional freedom from unwarrant ed interference with the judicial process by the executive arm of government and politicians. The road is now clear to expatiate on these basic e lements and draw examples as to their applicability in contemporary Nigeria. 1. Appointment and Removal of Judicial Officers and Judicial Staff To have a vibrant Judiciary, care must be taken fro m the onset in the selection or appointment process. Care must be taken that only highly traine d, competent, ethical and intelligent men and women are recruited. They must be creative because their creative role in the society is important in carrying out their responsibilities to ensure a balanced society. More so as their decision becomes prudent which will and in the deve lopment of the law. Underscoring the importance of appointing competent judicial officers to the bench, Charles Evans Hughes states: “A poor judge is perhaps, the most wasteful indulge nce of the community. You can refuse to patronize a merchant w ho does not carry good stock, but you have no recourse if you a re haled before a judge whose mental or moral goods are inferior. An honest, high Security of Tenure and Remuneration of Judges an d Supporting Staff It is said that Magistrates, Area and Customary Cou rt Judges and Shariah Court Judges are under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of N igeria not covered by the term “Judicial Officers”. They are appointed, promoted and subject ed to disciplinary control by the various states Judicial Service Commission, 60 even though they perform the bulk of judicial work and closer to the grassroots, their usefulness is under mined. One wonders why they can be referred to as non judicial officers. Remuneration at the Superior Courts of records lev el has been greatly improved upon in recent years even though there can still be room fo r improvement, compared with their colleagues in other developing and transition state s particularly having regard to the volume of work and the environment in which they operate. The major problem has to do with judges of the lowe r courts. They are not covered. They take home peanuts. Their salaries, allowances, environm ent and social facilities both in their places of work and family matters are pathetic. This paves way for manifest corruption and ineptitude and generally lack of seriousness to work. Notwithstanding the improved salaries of the Super ior Courts of records, allegations of corruption, continuously rears its ugly head in the cause of public discourse and judges of superior courts have been dismissed on proven alleg ation thereby casting a huge question mark on the independence of the Nigerian Judiciary. Onl y recently, some justices of the Court of Appeal were dismissed by the National Judicial Coun cil for receiving bribes on the course of hearing of election petition cases. We also witness ed the probing of judges of the High Courts, a Customary Court of Appeal judge, and a Shariah Cour t of Appeal Judge who were investigated and arrested by security operatives for allegedly c arting away large sums of money in Akwa Ibom State in an election petition tribunal. Two factors propel judicial officers to engage in corruption namely: (1) Greed . This simply mean that some judges want to style t hemselves after the ostentations lifestyles of politicians. They want to own duplex or skyscrapers in Dubai; they want to go to France and USA for long term hol idays and invest in practically all the known business of the world and most importantl y even take chieftaincy titles. (2) Habit – There seems justification to conclude that some judicial officers appeared to carry over this habit from the lower bench to the h igher bench Budgetary Provisions (Process) The involvement of the Federal Government of Nigeri a and State Government as the case may be in the budget process of Courts in Nigeria is an indication of the extent of judicial independence in Nigeria. Unchecked domination of o ne branch over the other can produce dysfunctional budgetary allocation process. In Nige ria, this plays down especially at the state level. Clear out constitutional provisions are rec klessly ignored by the Governors of the States particularly with regards to capital expenditure fo r state judiciaries. The constitution provides: 61 “Any amount standing to the credit of the Judiciary in the consolidated Revenue Fund of the State shall be pai d directly to the heads of the Courts concerned”. This provision rather than be complied with by the State Government is often breached especially where the head of Court within the state is not in the good books of the Governor of the State. This dysfunctional budgetary allocation has given rise to disastrous situation for the Judiciary. Absence of funds can lead to non-availa bility of physical structures or grossly inadequate structures like Court halls, chambers, R egistries and offices for supporting staff which will in turn affect the flow of cases and oth er essential services thus leading the system not been able to face the demand and deliver the re quisite justice demanded. Sometimes salaries and allowance of supporting staff can be t oo low and in arrears for months thereby creating an atmosphere of frustration and disconten tment, which normally breeds indiscipline corruption and eventually breakdown of the system. 4. Individual and Institutional Freedom from Unwarr anted Interference with the Judicial Process by the Executive arm of Government and Politicians. The history of the Judiciary around the world demon strates that the greatest danger of interference counsel from other government institut ions or political parties. An independent Judiciary must not only be independent in unwarrant ed interference with the judicial process by the executive arm of government and politicians but it must appear to be independent. This brings into operation the popular adage “Justice mu st not only be done, but also must seen to be done”. To remain just, the courts must not be influenced by any outside sources or appear to be capable of such influence. To aid such a perceptio n, they must have no real or apparent contact with a political party. If such contact exists, th ey would appear to be bias in favour of the policies of that party or if the party controls the state, to be biased in favour of the state, succumbing to pressures from the executive arms to inappropriate interference with judicial independence. Access to judges outside official channels has bee n one of the greatest problems that further threaten the independence of the Judiciary in Nigeria. Governors of states have direct access to judges within the state even as it relate s to matters in court and lawyers and clients often boast of their accessibility to judges or eve n to panel of an election petition hearing particular cases. The unresolved saga between the o ut gone Chief Justice of Nigeria and the embattled President of the Court of Appeal is an ex ample. Thence the unbridled access to judges and justices amount to self erosion by the J udiciary of the principle of independence of the Judiciary. What is more, judges, drivers, stew ards, gardeners, salesmen, orderlies, registrars and other staff reveal information as to who visits their boss to the outside world. International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research (IJPAMR), Vol. 2, No 3, August, 2014 Website: http://www.rcmss.com. ISSN: 2350-2231 (Online) ISSN: 2346-7215 (Print) Ibrahim A bdullahi 2014, 2(3):55-66 63 Research Centre for Management and Social Studies Intimidation and lawlessness by members of the exe cutive especially Governors abound Governors show contempt to court order when it does not please them and even the legislators. One wonders the justification where legislators had the impudence to summon a Chief Judge to come and answer question in connection with appoint ment in a Court of Appeal, a Court when the Chief Judge had no influence whatsoever, 62 or a situation when a state police commissioner refuses to comply with a High Court order on seven successive occasions. 63 Court Pronouncements This is however not to say the Judiciary have not a t all performed creditably in some spheres of human endeavours. The courts have made notable pron ouncements in the judgments delivered during this democratic dispensation, testing the su premacy of the constitution are the interpretation of the laws used by the government i n the pursuit of its economic policies like Revenue Allocation to states and local governments. 64 The Courts also made pronouncement on funding of newly local government in Lagos State, 65 this decision must have paid the way for the promulgation of the “Monitoring of Revenue Allo cation to Local Government Act 2005”. The Courts have also decried recklessness in the re gistration of political parties by its decision in INEC Vs MUSA 66 and more recently, the tenure of the five Governor s on tenure elongation RECOMMENDATIONS To revive the seemingly lost confidence in the Judi ciary and boost the independence of the Judiciary, the following recommendations are proffe red: 1. States governments should be made to uphold and c omply religiously with the provisions of section 121(3) of the Constitution of the Federal R epublic of Nigeria 1999 which provides that “any amount standing to the credit of the Judiciary in the consolidated revenue fund of the state shall be paid directly to the heads of court concer ned” and default in doing so should be criminalized. 2. There is the need to diversify the pool from whic h judicial appointments are made in view of the declining intellectual depth and overall quality of the judgments of some judges in Nigeria which are often conflicting. Review of criteria for appo intment of judicial officers to include qualified candidates from the bar, academia and industry is a dvocated. 3. There is the need to experiment inter- state tran sfer of judges. 4. Every obstacle to justice must be removed in the discharged of duties of judicial officers. In a developing community such as Nigeria, there is the need to devise the vision and objective of justice and the rule of law. Government should in their economic reform programmes also take the Judiciary into consideration as failure might l ead the economic reform programmes becoming unsuccessful. 5. Magistrates, Area Courts, Sharia Courts and Custo mary Court judges as well as Chairmen of the Rent Tribunal of the various states should be t reated as judicial officers especially as far as salaries and tenure of office are concerned. 6. Corrupt judges should be further wiped out by app lying an experimental practice of “detection by deception” which hopefully will be very effectiv e in detecting corrupt judges and lawyers alike. 7. Chapter II of the 1999 Constitution should be justi ciable by judicial activism. CONCLUSION The Judiciary is the mighty fortress against tyrann ous and oppressive laws. The importance of the Judiciary cannot therefore be over emphasized. It is not an overstatement to assert that an independent Judiciary is the greatest asset of a fr ee people. The Judiciary by the nature of its functions and role is the citizen last line of defe nce in a free society that is the line separating constitutionalism from totalitarianism. 67 I however need to appreciate that the position of the Judiciary in a democratic setting is a delicate one. More often than not, the Judiciary has been the sacrificial lambs on the altar of societal imperfection and contradictions. When poli ticians rig election, it is the Judiciary that is called upon to decide who actually won the election . Again, when politicians loot the nation’s treasury in their unconscionable quest to become mi llionaires and billionaires, it is in the judges that are called upon to hold the tribunals to inqui re into their activities or to try them, and so on and so forth. In other circumstances, the Judiciar y finds itself in a no win situation and whichever party loses readily cast aspersion on the integrity of the presiding justices. 68 This is the unfortunate lot the Nigerian Judiciary finds it self today. Interestingly, the constitution itself as interpret ed by the courts lied against itself in section 17(2) (e) of the 1999 Constitution. The section pro vides: “The independence, impartiality and integrity of th e courts of law and easy accessibility thereto shall be secured and maintained” Impressive as this provision may appear to be, it i s however placed under Chapter II of the ‘Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy” whose provisions are non- justiciable by virtue of section 6(6) (c) of the Co nstitution. Thus the high sounding declaration of section 17(2) (e) of the Constitution has no bit e and what could have been a constitutional guarantee of judicial independence is no more than a slogan in Nigeria END NOTES 1. The Guardian of Thursday, December 30, 1993, p. 2 . 2. See Justice A. Fataye Williams (Rtd) former Chief Justice of Nigeria in a presentation at the All Nigeria Judges Conference Ilorin, Kwara State 8 th – 11 th March, 1992. 3. See the Guardian of Monday 4 th April 1994, p. 24 with a story captioned “NBA set to prove Corruption Charges against Judges” See also Weekend Concord of Saturday, December 11, 1993 with the lead story “Chief Justice Muhammad Be llo Kick him out that, Lawyers Demand” and Tell Newsmagazine of February 7 th , 1994 with the lead story “The Supreme Court Scand als and Official Gratifications; Abuja Construction Dea ls and Shady Oil Contracts” 4. See Garner A. B, Black’s Law Dictionary, 8 th Edition, West Publishing Co. 2004, p. 785. 5. See Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 3 rd Edition at p. 1756. 6. See Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at p. 294. 7. Hon. Justice Umar F. A, “The Role of the Bar and Bench in the sustenance of Democracy” In Contemporary issues in Nigerian Law, Legal Essays i n Honour of Hon. Justice Umaru Faruk Abdullahi, CON, Browntel Books, 2006, pp. 85 & 89. 8. Daudu J. B. “The Independence of the Nigeria Judi ciary in the light of Emerging Socio-Political and Security Challenges”. A key note speech availab le at htt//www.nba.org.ng/web/theindependenceofthenigeria njudiciary retrieved on 5/7/2014, p. 1. 9. See Section 6(6) (a) of the Constitution of the F ederal Republic of Nigeria 1999 Judges have the ultimate responsibility for decisions regarding freedoms, rights and duties of natural and legal persons within their jurisdiction. The independence of each individual judge safeguards every person’s right to have their case decided solely on the basis of the law, the evidence and facts, without any improper influence. A well-functioning, efficient and independent judiciary is an essential requirement for a fair, consistent and neutral administration of justice. Consequently, judicial independence is an indispensable element of the right to due process, the rule of law and democracy. The separation of powers is a fundamental guarantee of the independence of the judiciary. In the decision-making process, judges should have freedom to decide cases impartially, in accordance with their interpretation of the law and the facts. They should be able to act without any restriction or improper influence. Direct or indirect pressure, threats or interferences, should not come from any quarter or for any reason. The principle of independence of the judiciary has been laid down in various human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 10) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 14). There are also a number of UN standards, in particular the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1985 and the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct of 2002. Within the European framework, the right to an independent and impartial tribunal is guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Apart from the ECHR, there exist a number of more detailed texts, among them the Council of Europe Recommendation on Judges: Independence, Efficiency and Responsibilities adopted by the Committee of Ministers in 2010. In the broader OSCE region, participating States have committed themselves to ensuring the independence of the judiciary in the Copenhagen Document (1990), the Moscow Document (1991) and the Istanbul Document (1999). These Commitments were recalled and specified in the Brussels Declaration on Criminal Justice Systems and in the Ministerial Council’s Brussels Decision on Organized Crime. At the Ministerial Council meeting in Helsinki in 2008, OSCE participating States were encouraged to enhance their efforts to strengthen this aspect of the rule of law. The OSCE/ODIHR’s Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia were elaborated against the background of the above-mentioned international standards. The basic principles ensuring the independence of the judiciary should be set out in the constitution. Judges are subject only to the law and their decisions should not be revised outside the appeals procedure. All decisions regarding the appointment and the professional career of judges should be based on merit, by means of the application of objective criteria. The evaluation of judges should never be based on the content of their decisions and, in particular, acquittals should in no way be considered as a sign of failure. One of the most important standards underpinning the autonomy of the judiciary is irremovability. That is, for ordinary judges to be appointed permanently until retirement. The irremovability of judges, including protection from involuntary transfers, as well as adequate remuneration in conformity with the dignity of the office are other factors that constitute the backbone of genuine independence. Furthermore, it is important to strike the appropriate balance between judges’ accountability and their independence in adjudication. Disciplinary responsibility of judges shall not extend to the content of their verdicts or to judicial mistakes. Also, the body that initiates cases of judicial discipline should not be the one that adjudicates them. Judges facing these bodies should enjoy procedural safeguards and disciplinary hearings must be fully transparent. It is axiomatic that a judge deciding a case should not act on any order or instruction of any third party, inside or outside the judiciary. A hierarchical organization of the judiciary which would amount to subordination of the judges to the court chairpersons or to higher instances in their judicial decision-making activities would be a clear infringement of this principle. In order for freedom from external influence to be ensured, the law should provide sanctions against outside actors seeking to influence judges in any manner. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985 Whereas in the Charter of the United Nations the peoples of the world affirm, inter alia , their determination to establish conditions under which justice can be maintained to achieve international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination, Whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines in particular the principles of equality before the law, of the presumption of innocence and of the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, Whereas the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights both guarantee the exercise of those rights, and in addition, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights further guarantees the right to be tried without undue delay, Whereas frequently there still exists a gap between the vision underlying those principles and the actual situation, Whereas the organization and administration of justice in every country should be inspired by those principles, and efforts should be undertaken to translate them fully into reality, Whereas rules concerning the exercise of judicial office should aim at enabling judges to act in accordance with those principles, Whereas judges are charged with the ultimate decision over life, freedoms, rights, duties and property of citizens, Whereas the Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, by its resolution 16, called upon the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control to include among its priorities the elaboration of guidelines relating to the independence of judges and the selection, professional training and status of judges and prosecutors, Whereas it is, therefore, appropriate that consideration be first given to the role of judges in relation to the system of justice and to the importance of their selection, training and conduct, The following basic principles, formulated to assist Member States in their task of securing and promoting the independence of the judiciary should be taken into account and respected by Governments within the framework of their national legislation and practice and be brought to the attention of judges, lawyers, members of the executive and the legislature and the public in general. The principles have been formulated principally with professional judges in mind, but they apply equally, as appropriate, to lay judges, where they exist. Independence of the judiciary 1. The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary. 2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. 3. The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law. 4. There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law. 5. Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals. 6. The principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary to ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are respected. 7. It is the duty of each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to properly perform its functions. Freedom of expression and association 8. In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, members of the judiciary are like other citizens entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly; provided, however, that in exercising such rights, judges shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of their office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. 9. Judges shall be free to form and join associations of judges or other organizations to represent their interests, to promote their professional training and to protect their judicial independence. Qualifications, selection and training 10. Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory. Conditions of service and tenure 11. The term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by law. 12. Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists. 13. Promotion of judges, wherever such a system exists, should be based on objective factors, in particular ability, integrity and experience. 14. The assignment of cases to judges within the court to which they belong is an internal matter of judicial administration. Professional secrecy and immunity 15. The judiciary shall be bound by professional secrecy with regard to their deliberations and to confidential information acquired in the course of their duties other than in public proceedings, and shall not be compelled to testify on such matters. 16. Without prejudice to any disciplinary procedure or to any right of appeal or to compensation from the State, in accordance with national law, judges should enjoy personal immunity from civil suits for monetary damages for improper acts or omissions in the exercise of their judicial functions. Discipline, suspension and removal 17. A charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her judicial and professional capacity shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under an appropriate procedure. The judge shall have the right to a fair hearing. The examination of the matter at its initial stage shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise requested by the judge. 18. Judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their duties. 19. All disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be determined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct. 20. Decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to an independent review. This principle may not apply to the decisions of the highest court and those of the legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings. See also The core international human rights instruments Universal human rights instruments Charter of the United Nations The International Bill of Human Rights Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 Links Human rights conferences Human rights bodies Publications The 20th Anniversary of the OHCHR