DISCUSS THE SOCIAL ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCIES OF BOKO HARAM

ABSTRACT The Boko Haram fundamentalist Islamic group is the first insurgent organization in Nigeria to be classified as a terrorist organization by the United States of America and its allies. Since 2009 the violence the group has unleashed on the Nigerian State is unprecedented in the history of insurgency in the country. Several studies have intellectualized the origin, motive and other activities of this infamous rebellious group. To advance the discourse on Boko Haram, this study examines the measures the Nigerian government has taken so far to address the menace posed by the Boko Haram insurgents. Using library research and interview methods, the findings of the study indicate that first, that the path Government should not follow is using the same methods it used to combat the Niger Delta militants to address the Boko Haram insurgents. Second, that peace negotiation is most unlikely to succeed with insurgents like those of Boko Haram with vile ideologies, whose core demands undermine democracy and good governance. Rather, it is more likely to succeed with insurgent groups pursuing legitimate political or economic based grievances that are capable of deepening democracy and good governance, that is, if Government accepts their core demands. Third, that peace negotiation is most unlikely to succeed with Boko Haram insurgents, since they do not have the capacity to lead a provincial government, after disavowing terrorism. This study strongly recommends that to checkmate the threat posed by Boko Haram insurgents, Government should treat them like terrorists rather than freedom fighters THE HISTORY OF BOKO HARAM Boko Haram, officially called Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah West Africa Province, ISWAP), and formerly called Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād' "Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad"), is a jihadist group based in northeastern Nigeria, also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon. The group is led by Abubakar Shekau. Estimates of the group's membership varies between 7,000 and 10,000 fighters. The group initially had links to al-Qaeda, but in 2014, it expressed support for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant before pledging formal allegiance to it in March 2015. After its founding in 2002, Boko Haram's increasing radicalization led to a violent uprising in July 2009 in which its leader was summarily executed. Its unexpected resurgence, following a mass prison break in September 2010, was accompanied by increasingly sophisticated attacks, initially against soft targets, and progressing in 2011 to include suicide bombings of police buildings and the United Nations office in Abuja. The government's establishment of a state of emergency at the beginning of 2012, extended in the following year to cover the entire northeast of Nigeria, resulted in a marked increase in both security force abuses and militant attacks. Boko Haram killed more than 13,000 civilians between 2009 and 2015, including around 10,000 in 2014, in attacks occurring mainly in northeast Nigeria. The Nigerian military initially proved ineffective in countering the insurgency, hampered by an entrenched culture of official corruption. Since mid-2014, the militants have been in control of swathes of territory in and around their home state of Borno, estimated at 50,000 square kilometres (20,000 sq mi) in January 2015, but have not captured the capital of Borno state, Maiduguri, where the group was originally based. However, after joint military operation with Nigerian Armed Forces, Chadian Armed Forces, Cameroonian Armed Forces, local vigilante groups, local hunters and local fishermen, Boko Haram lost its capital Gwoza and most of its occupied territories while it is still controlling southern parts of Borno State. Boko Haram founding and early years Mohammed Yusuf founded the sect that became known as Boko Haram in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the north-eastern state of Borno. He established a religious complex and school that attracted poor Muslim families from across Nigeria and neighbouring countries. The center had the political goal of creating an Islamic state, and became a recruiting ground for jihadis. By denouncing the police and state corruption, Yusuf attracted followers from unemployed youths. It has been speculated that the reason Yusuf founded Boko Haram appears to be that he saw an opportunity to exploit public outrage at government corruption by linking it to Western influence in governance.[64] He is reported to have used the existing infrastructure in Borno of the Izala Society (Jama'at Izalatil Bidiawa Iqamatus Sunnah), a popular conservative Islamic sect, to recruit members, before breaking away to form his own faction. The Izala were originally welcomed into government, along with people sympathetic to Yusuf. Boko Haram conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence, withdrawing from society into remote north-eastern areas. The government repeatedly ignored warnings about the increasingly militant character of the organization. The Council of Ulama advised the government and the Nigerian Television Authority not to broadcast Yusuf's preaching, but their warnings were ignored. Yusuf's arrest elevated him to hero status.. ITS SOCIAL ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCIES Within the last few years, heightened social insecurity in Nigeria has arguably fuelled the crime rate, leaving unpalatable consequences for the nation’s economy and its growth. For the purpose of definition, insecurity could be described as the presence of fear and absence of economic or physical protection for persons, buildings, organisations or country against destruction or threats like crime or attacks. The rates of terrorist bombings, kidnappings, armed robbery attacks on banks as well as other violent crimes in recent months, have led to a prevalent massive loss of the nation’s human resources. This ugly trend poses a threat to the future of the nation’s agricultural productivity level, private sector investment volume, petroleum sector growth rate, manpower and overall economic development. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria’s unemployment rate increased to 23.9 per cent in 2011 compared with 21.1 per cent in 2010 and 19.7 per cent of 2009. The country has a youth population of 80 million, representing about 60 per cent of the total population with a growth rate of 2.6 per cent per year and the national demography suggests that the youth population remains vibrant with an average annual entrant to the labour force at 1.8 million between 2006 and 2011. Several corporate organisations that have human resource policies on workers’ compensation, insurance and other forms of workers’ welfare have deliberately refused to implement them. In most cases, the list of contract staff and expatriates on their payroll far surpasses that of other personnel in a country with disturbing unemployment rate records. The Federal Ministry of Labour has over the years, abandoned its responsibility as regards labour inspection and general supervision of employers in the country. “Malnutrition is the underlying cause of morbidity and mortality of a large proportion of children under-5 in Nigeria. It accounts for more than 50 per cent of deaths of children in this age bracket. The deaths of newborn babies in Nigeria represent a quarter of the total number of deaths of children under-five. The majority of these occur within the first week of life, mainly due to complications during pregnancy and delivery reflecting the intimate link between newborn survival and the quality of maternal care. Similarly, a woman’s chance of dying from pregnancy and childbirth in Nigeria is 1 in 13. Amidst this alarming level of social insecurity, the wide gap between the few corrupt rich citizens and the poor is further being widened. For instance, the value of private properties acquired with public funds which have been obviously looted by a few ex-public office holders without rebuke, is scaring. Private aircraft owned only by a few politicians, businessmen and clergymen are also estimated to have grown in the country from about 20 in year 2000 to over 150 in 2012, at a time when many Nigerians are living below the poverty line. Massive loss of human resources and its effect as well as government’s unimpressive response to the various forms of crime do not offer hopes that the nation is likely to realize its short and long term economic targets. The 2012 Report from Amnesty International indicates that Nigeria recorded 215 deaths from violent attacks by suspected members of the Boko Haram sect between June and December 2011. Kidnapping has equally increased in both frequency and scope, especially in the Niger Delta states and the south eastern part of the country. Conclusions First, the group may have been nurtured from outside. Sources in the Maiduguri religious establishment say it is possible that money from Salafist groups in Saudi Arabia supported it in the early years. It appears that Boko Haram members also received training in rebel camps in the Sahel during a time of crisis for the group. Second, Boko Haram has grown at a time when there are many national issues that draw anger and feed the group. This includes the continued killing and corruption perpetrated by the police on people connected to the group; the brutal manner in which the police behave to the public at large; the financial corruption of the government; the moral corruption of the religious establishment (as perceived by Boko Haram); a festering conflict in Plateau state. 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