abstract ecomog roles to liberia war

ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to evaluate an emerging indigenous African peacekeeping capability in light of concerns regarding ECOMOG’s effectiveness and conduct. ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia from 1990 to 1997 constitutes the focus of this study. We argue that the course of ECOWAS diplomacy in Liberia was fraught with problems and growing pains; the result of a lack of a cease-fire on the ground before the force was deployed; the absence of a clear and enforceable mandate and divisive regional power politics. These shortcomings notwithstanding, we conclude that ECOMOG’s efforts in Liberia have helped the region as a whole. The net result has been a rapid but positive learning experience for the peacekeeping nations of West Africa, improved regional stability and an emerging regionally-based conflict management capacity. The first section of this paper traces the birth of ECOMOG to its intervention in Liberia. In the second section, we evaluate the broad range of tools of diplomacy and coercion at ECOWAS’ disposal in the context of that organization’s attempt to manage the Liberian crisis. The third section briefly examines the conditions for success and failure of the ECOMOG initiative. INTRODUCTION These informative and well-researched studies look at the evolution of one of the world's first subregional security mechanisms, ECOMOG, the ceasefire-monitoring group of the Economic Community of West African States. In the first book, Adebajo, who heads the Africa program of the International Peace Academy, looks in great detail at ECOMOG's complex role during the Liberian civil war of 1990-96. He examines how the war in its various phases reflected the interplay of events, policies, and personalities at the national, regional, and international level, and in particular how Nigeria's ambition to play a dominant role in West Africa affected ECOMOG's development. In the second book, he traces how ECOMOG fared in two further peacemaking efforts following its mixed record of success in Liberia. He sees the repetition of earlier mistakes but also evidence of a learning curve that could bode well for greater stability in the region if additional international resources could be mobilized to strengthen ECOMOG's institutional capacity. In an attempt to end the bloody civil war in Liberia, in August 1990, a group of West African nations under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)1 took the unprecedented step of sending a peacekeeping force into Monrovia. This force, known as the Economic Community Cease-Fire Monitoring Group, (ECOMOG), has now spent almost three years in Liberia, yet its goal of bringing peace to the country remains elusive. The ECOMOG intervention succeeded in temporarily stopping the bloodshed and ethnic killing, and is therefore regarded by many as a model of regional conflict resolution. However, ECOMOG has not integrated human rights protection and promotion into its activities, and this has proved to be a serious shortcoming. Pursuing peace without recognizing the centrality of human rights has left ECOMOG embroiled in a conflict with few immediate prospects for resolution: In the interests of ending the war and defeating a seemingly intractable adversary in Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), ECOMOG has allied itself with other warring factions, which undermines its credibility and therefore its ability to bring peace. THE ECOMOG ROLE IN LIBERIAN WAR ECOMOG is a West African peacekeeping force that began with approximately 3,000 troops and has grown to between 10,000 and 12,000 troops, the vast majority being Nigerians. ECOMOG included forces from five countries of ECOWAS: Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, later joined by Mali. In September 1991, as part of the ongoing peace process and in an effort to appease Taylor, Senegalese troops also joined.13 In August 1990, without any prospect for intervention by the United States or the United Nations, ECOMOG arrived in Monrovia to separate the warring factions and to stop the bloodshed. The West African countries justified their intervention on the grounds that it was no longer an internal conflict since thousands of their own nationals were trapped in Liberia and tens of thousands of refugees had fled to neighboring countries. The ECOMOG mandate was to impose a cease-fire, help form an interim government and hold elections within 12 months. Unfortunately, with NPFL attacks continuing, there was no peace to keep, and ECOMOG was thrust into combat to push the NPFL out of Monrovia. One would be hard-pressed to visit Monrovia without hearing, time and again, "Thank God for ECOMOG." The sentiments of many Monrovia residents were summarized by a Liberian medical worker who said: "ECOMOG was our savior; it was a salvation. ECOMOG saved the population of Monrovia. They avoided fighting, but were pushed into a corner. We feel sorry for them; they have no cause to die here for this stupid, senseless war."17 A number of other Liberians and expatriates pointed to the disaster in Somalia, noting that were it not for ECOMOG, Monrovia would have disintegrated into a situation like Mogadishu, with none of the factions able to win a clear victory and all of them preying upon the civilian population. President Sawyer noted that the West African subregion has limited resources, but that comparisons with Somalia were apt. "It took 28,000 U.S. troops in Somalia to distribute food. We have here less than 10,000 ECOMOG forces, assaulted by a force in Taylor's estimate of 30-70,000, whose purposes are known to everybody."18 ECOMOG ROLE ON EFFORTS AT PEACE In early 1992, there was some hope of a political settlement. Roads between Monrovia and NPFL territory were opened and ECOMOG troops were permitted to conduct inspection tours of NPFL areas. In January, the Interim Elections Commission was sworn in, composed of three representatives of NPRAG and two from the IGNU. On March 16, the ad hoc Supreme Court was sworn in, composed of three judges named by the NPRAG and two by the IGNU. In April, the University of Liberia re-opened. Efforts to implement peace agreements continued throughout the year. It should be noted that ULIMO was not a party to the Yamoussoukro agreement, a fact that was later cited by Taylor to justify his noncompliance. In April, a mini-summit of West African states, including Charles Taylor, was held in Geneva. The participants re-affirmed their commitment to the Yamoussoukro IV accords, and established a new timetable for ECOMOG deployment.26 The most important feature of the Geneva meeting was that ECOMOG would secure a buffer zone on the Liberian-Sierra Leone border, to separate ULIMO and NPFL forces. However, just after signing the accord, Taylor announced that he had been forced to sign and indicated that he was not prepared to disarm or encamp his fighters. On April 30, ECOMOG began its long-awaited deployment in NPFL territory, with the aim of disarming all factions and establishing an atmosphere in which free and fair elections could be held. In late May, however, six Senegalese soldiers were captured during a gun battle with the NPFL in Lofa County and executed, reportedly by having their throats slit. As a result, all ECOMOG troops were withdrawn from Lofa Country to Monrovia. The fragile cease-fire was finally broken in August, when ULIMO launched an attack from Sierra Leone against the NPFL. Skirmishes between the two rebel groups had occurred sporadically since late 1991, especially near the Sierra Leone border, but they had never amounted to a full-scale offensive. The NPFL forces were routed and at least 30,000 displaced persons streamed into Monrovia. Civilians reportedly were targeted by both sides during the fighting, with fighters looting in villages, stealing from fleeing refugees, and executing those suspected of sympathizing with the opposing faction. Taylor accused ECOMOG of supporting ULIMO. THE ECOMOG ROLE IN QUICK RESPONSE The urgency of the situation compelled ECOMOG to adopt a new strategy: it accepted the assistance of other Liberian factions in fighting the NPFL. The human rights record of these factions -- ULIMO and the AFL -- ranged from suspect to abysmal. The AFL was thoroughly discredited by its horrific abuses during the 1980s and especially during the war in 1990, when it massacred civilians and devastated Monrovia. ULIMO is an offshoot of the AFL, and its conduct in the areas it captured in 1992 reportedly included attacks on civilians, looting, and executions of suspected NPFL sympathizers. The formal connections between the AFL and ULIMO are unclear, although most of ULIMO's key commanders are former AFL leaders, and hundreds of AFL soldiers apparently left their barracks to join ULIMO. The relationship between ECOMOG and these groups seems to be built upon the classic view that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." After first supporting the right of the AFL to defend itself from attack, ECOMOG soon permitted the AFL to operate alongside the multinational troops, although the AFL retained a separate command structure and controls certain areas on its own. ECOMOG claims that ULIMO operates independently, but it is clear that some coordination exists. There is little indication that ECOMOG tries to curb excesses by these factions. ECOMOG ROLE ON LIBERIA BY SENDING AIR STRIKES Since late October, ECOMOG has conducted a series of bombing and strafing raids using Nigeria's Alpha jets on Taylor territory. Taylor has no air force, and ECOMOG planes can easily reach targets all over the country. Targets have included the port of Buchanan and areas around Gbarnga, Kakata, Harbel and Greenville. A particularly serious charge involves violations of medical neutrality, such as attacks on hospitals. Precise information about the targets and casualties are not available, because independent observers have been prevented for security reasons from travelling to the sites. NPFL officials report that hundreds of civilians have been killed and wounded. There is no indication that ECOMOG has conducted any investigations about attacks on civilians, hospitals or international relief operations in Taylor territory. There have been many reports, by ECOMOG as well as other neutral sources, of the NPFL using the civilian population or civilian institutions as a shield for its military activities. Using civilians as a shield is a direct violations of Article 51 (7) of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, which states: The presence of movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favor or impede military operations. Civilian Targets ECOMOG has distinct responsibilities under international humanitarian law to protect the civilian population. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2444 (1968) affirms: . . . the following principles for observance by all government and other authorities responsible for action in armed conflicts: (a) that the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited; (b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations as such; (c) That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible. The preamble to this resolution clearly states that these fundamental humanitarian law principles apply "in all armed conflicts." Humanitarian law prohibits attacks that, while aiming at a military target, may be expected to inflict disproportionate harm on the civilian population. This rule of proportionality is set forth in Article 51(5)(b) of Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which forbids any attack: which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. ECOMOG has a duty to issue rules of engagement designed to strictly limit or avoid civilian casualties, in compliance with the rule of proportionality. Despite ECOMOG denials of wrongdoing by its pilots, the weight of evidence indicates that pilots have conducted indiscriminate attacks and have deliberately attacked relief activities, in violation of the rules of war. One foreign relief worker noted that the manner in which ECOMOG is conducting air strikes is indiscriminate: There is evidence that civilian targets have been hit, like the CRS warehouse in Buchanan, the hospital in Harbel and an ambulance near the hospital, although it is not clear who was in the ambulance. ECOMOG is trying to squeeze Taylor at all costs, and human rights questions then arise. They are using indiscriminate attacks, shooting from canons without clear targets. The strategy is to push the NPFL as far out as possible and to regain territory. It's a pax nigerian -- in order to get peace, they must neutralize Taylor. Their mandate is to guarantee peace, and they are going beyond the spirit of the text.43 Among the air attacks that have caused concern about the civilian toll are the following: • On November 16, 1992, ECOMOG bombed the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) warehouse in Buchanan, destroying large quantities of rice and blended food. The warehouse was clearly marked with "CRS" painted in large letters on the roof. • The attack on the village of Gbinta in the Ivory Coast at the Liberian border on February 27. According to the Ivorian government, six people were wounded -- five soldiers and one customs official.47 Although ECOMOG claimed that it was aiming for the Liberian side of the border, it is highly unlikely that they could have mistakenly hit Ivorian territory, since the border is clearly marked by a river. In addition, at the time of the attack, a UNICEF convoy with humanitarian supplies was just crossing the border into Liberia, and another convoy by MSF Belgium was on the way. The attack has been widely interpreted as a warning by ECOMOG to the Ivorian authorities that they must prevent the NPFL from using the Ivory Coast border crossings to re-arm and re-supply his forces. Despite Ivorian contentions that they have effectively sealed up the border since the imposition of sanctions in November 1992, the border is known to be very porous. The Ivorian authorities have supported Taylor throughout much of the Liberian conflict. • On March 2, a CRS truck distributing food on the outskirts of Buchanan was strafed. Reports indicate that between 75 and 100 civilians, mostly women and children, were near the truck when it was attacked. The truck was marked with the CRS logo. • The strafing raid on the market in Gbarnga and Kollila on March 27, which relief workers reported left four civilians dead and 26 others taken to Phebe Hospital for injuries. Another strafing raid on Gbarnga took place on April 6.48 Many reports about the strafings of civilians or civilian targets indicate that ECOMOG planes chase civilians. One foreign journalist attributed this practice to "hot-rodding" by the pilots and soldiers. "This isn't Desert Storm," she said. "This is a low tech war, and they are sloppy."49 Another journalist observed: "They are probably not under orders, but the young pilots do what they want to."50 ECOMOG contends that any civilian casualties are unintentional and the result of collateral damage. General Olurin stated that ECOMOG conducts air strikes aimed at supply routes and arms caches in NPFL territory, but denied reports that ECOMOG planes intentionally hit civilian targets. He claimed that the air strikes were "very, very carefully limited to strategic locations."51 In an interview with Africa Watch, General Olurin went so far as to accuse the NPFL of putting their own explosives in certain locations, like Phebe Hospital outside Gbarnga, and then blaming ECOMOG for bombing.52 RECOMMENDATIONS • ECOMOG should launch an immediate investigation into the air attacks on civilians and civilian targets, as well as violations of medical neutrality, by its forces in NPFL territory, and make its findings public. • Accountability for past human rights abuses by all sides to the conflict must be pursued, and the establishment of some form of Truth Commission should be considered. • Human rights guarantees must be incorporated into the peace process. • A full investigation should be conducted into the killing of Brian Garnham. • All warring factions -- the NPFL, AFL and ULIMO -- must be disarmed and demobilized in a systematic and even-handed manner. ECOMOG must cease supplying arms or amunition to any of the warring parties. • Humanitarian assistance must be permitted to reach civilians throughout Liberia, including the population of displaced persons in NPFL territory. In addition, ECOMOG must ensure the security of relief operations to the best of its ability, and must never subject them to attack by ECOMOG planes. • ECOMOG should assist in the repatriation of refugees from neighboring countries and the return of internally displaced persons. Conclusions and Lessons The ECOMOG initiative, the first of its kind in Africa, was a significant milestone in African politics. It signified a bold attempt in designing African solutions to African problems within the current environment of international neglect and state failure. Given the novelty of the initiative for Africa, the complexity of the Liberian conflict, the intra-regional rivalries, the lack of experience in multilateral diplomacy on the part of sub-regional leaders and the difficult financial and political circumstances within which ECOMOG had to operate, there is little doubt that the initiative was ill-fated from the outset. Overall, the ECOMOG initiative is indicative of a number of lessons both for policy and theory on peacekeeping in Africa. First, the intervention confirms previous claims that intra-state conflicts do not lend themselves to interventions that are premised on ‘traditional peacekeeping.’ Any strategy that is weak in capability will not be taken seriously as a credible a deterrent and is more likely to fail under extreme and hostile conditions like those that existed in Liberia. This may mean that intervention forces must be prepared to invoke robust mandates when necessary, acquiesce and possibly withdraw in the face of stronger counter-forces in other instances and, if incapable of mustering the necessary resolve, be prepared to not get involved in the first place. In retrospect, since there was no cease-fire in place before ECOMOG’s deployment and given the nature of circumstances in Liberia, it was imperative for Nigeria to get all ECOWAS members, especially the Francophone members to agree to the use of robust force. This it did not do. An agreement for more robust measures might have ensured hastened compliance from Taylor who would not have had allies in the sub-region. Indeed, the United Nations/ECOMOG intervention in neighboring Sierra Leone during which peacekeepers were abducted and humiliated by Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels points to the obvious and embarrassing conclusion that the lessons of the Liberian intervention have not been taken seriously. A second important lesson is that regional political rivalries should be recognized as a serious influence, if not constraint, on peacekeeping effectiveness. Today’s intrastate conflicts are seen too much as internal problems. Instead, they need to better placed in a regional context, not only with respect to regional rivalries, but also how refugee flows affect conflict dynamics and how arms flows and local support for insurgencies undermine efforts at establishing a stable environment in which peace can be nurtured. Finally, there may be ways of counter-balancing these constraints. For example, while it is realistic in today’s world to argue that sub-regional organizations should manage crises in their backyard, it is also realistic to expect that there be global support for such initiatives. REFERENCE 4 Africa Watch interview with Maj. General Adetunji Olurin, ECOMOG Field Commander, Washington D.C., April 2, 1993. 5 Africa Watch interview with Amos Sawyer, President of the Interim Government of National Unity, Monrovia, Liberia, March 10, 1993. Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 7, 1993. 8 Africa Watch interview with Brig. S.V.L. Malu, Chief of Staff ECOMOG, Monrovia, Liberia, March 9, 1993. 9 The Black Berets are a militia of some 500 men formed by the Interim Government in 1992 and trained in Guinea. 10 The Nimba Redemption Council appeared on the scene in January 1993, under the leadership of Karpeh Dweyean, who lives in the U.S. Little information is available about its size or strength, despite its claims to have "thousands" of fighters. Neil Henry, "African Dictators Embark on Democratic Mission," The Washington Post, August 10, 1990. The INPFL was effectively dissolved in late 1992 after fighting broke out between it and the NPFL at Caldwell. Prince Johnson is currently living in Nigeria. Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 3, 1993. Interview with President Sawyer, March 10, 1993. Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 4, 1993. Nicholas Kotch, "Defiant Taylor 'will not surrender,'" The Guardian, March 27, 1993. "Taylor Discusses ECOMOG, UN Security Council," Gbarnga Radio ELBC, March 26, 1993, reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, March 31, 1993. "ECOMOG uncovers grave," West Africa, March 29-April 4, 1993. "ECOMOG Issues Directive on Looters," London, BBC World Service November 2, 1992, reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, November 3, 1992. Interview with Maj. Gen. Olurin, April 2, 1993. Americas Watch, "El Salvador: Peace and Human Rights, Successes and Shortcomings of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador," September 2, 1992.